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Roy J. Adams' Proposai for a Training 
Levy Scheme 
Ross MARTIN 
and 
Errol BLACK 
Roy J. Adams' proposai for a training levy scheme for Canada is very 
timely1, coming as it does at a time when we face the paradoxical situation 
of relatively high unemployment co-existing with apparent shortages in skil-
led occupations. In September, 1980, the Brandon and District Labour 
Council proposed a similar scheme in a brief presented to the fédéral 
government Employment Opportunities for the 80's Task Force, chaired by 
Warren Allmand2. The two proposais are similar in many respects, but 
there are also some important différences which we believe merit discussion. 
THE CONTEXT FOR A TRAINING LEVY SCHEME 
To begin with, Adams neglects to situate the rôle of training in the 
broader context of the current problems facing the Canadian eeonomy. 
Briefly summarized, his analysis is as follows. Existing training arrange-
ments in Canada are inadéquate. To correct thèse inadequacies and increase 
the output of trained manpower, new arrangements should be instituted. Of 
the proposais currently on the agenda, the one which holds out the most 
promise both on equity and efficiency grounds is some form of training levy 
scheme. Introduction of such a scheme, even on a very modest basis, would 
yield many benefits, among them: an increase in the quality of job oppor-
tunities available to women, teenagers and other individuals caught in dead 
end jobs; an increase in the supply of skilled craftsmen; and rising produc-
tivity. 
We do not share Adams' optimism that a training levy scheme, or any 
other training scheme, will, of and in itself, lead to the results he predicts. 
Indeed, in the absence of other, prior, institutional changes we doubt that a 
training levy scheme would hâve very much impact at ail. This becomes évi-
dent if the "unemployment-shortage of skilled workers" paradox is con-
fronted head on. 
The overall trend in unemployment in Canada over the last 20 years has 
been upwards. Thus, for the three periods 1962-69, 1972-79 and 1976-79 the 
officiai aggregate rates of unemployment were 4.5, 6.8 and 7.8 percent, 
respectively3. Our analysis suggests that this trend is attributable to two 
* MARTIN, Ross and Errol BLACK, Brandon & District Labour Council. 
1 ADAMS, Roy J., "Towards a More Compétent Labour Force: A Training Levy 
Scheme for Canada," Relations Industrielles, volume 35, number 3, 1980. 
2 "Brandon and District Labour Council Position Paper on Employment and 
Training." 
3 Department of Finance, Ottawa, Economie Review, April, 1974 and April, 1980. 
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main factors, namely, structural changes in the economy which hâve led to 
the displacement of workers, and the failure of aggregate spending to grow 
at a rate sufficient to provide jobs for an expanding work force. 
In theory, the government has the capacity to regulate the rate of 
growth in the economy, so as to ensure that sufficient jobs are available to 
both displaced workers and new workers coming into the labour market. In 
practice, the government has failed to develop policies which would permit 
this objective to be achieved. As we see it, the main problem with govern-
ment policy in Canada is that it is predicated on the assumption that govern-
ment's rôle in the economy is a residual one; specifically, government 
policies are intended to create an environment favourable to private sector 
investment. This rôle is not, of course, a trivial one. On the contrary, 
government attempts to create such an environment hâve led to an expand-
ed and more sophisticated rôle for the public sector in the economy. 
The point is, however, that this assumption ignores one of the main 
lessons we learned — or should hâve learned — from the Great Dépression: 
we cannot rely on market forces and private investment décisions to achieve 
social objectives. So long as the basic décisions on investment spending are 
vested in private individuals — firms, it is impossible for government to en-
sure that the timing and volume of investment spending will be compatible 
with the requirements of the economy and population. Moreover, along 
with the problem of regulating the timing and volume of investment, there 
are also the questions of its composition — for example, manufacturing vs. 
services — and its régional disposition. 
In our view, the unemployment problem will persist in this country un-
til we develop new institutional mechanisms for regulating investment spen-
ding, mechanisms which involve the replacement of market forces and 
private control of investment spending by planning and collective control. 
The explanation for the apparent shortage of skilled/trained man-
power has its origins in the same phenomenon which underlies the high level 
of unemployment; the initiative for the bulk of the training undertaken in 
the economy is left to private sector initiative. This has several important 
implications. First, private sector firms will provide only that training which 
serves their immédiate interests and enhances profitability. This means that 
the bulk of organized training provided in the private sector tends to be 
firm-specific or industry-specific. Consequently, the skills acquired through 
such training are not fully transportable to other firms and industries. 
Secondly, training tends to be cyclical in nature. Thus, during a downturn 
in the economy — or a period of stagnation — training programmes are 
curtailed and trainees laid off. Then during the upturn there are insufficient 
skilled workers to meet manpower requirements. And thirdly, firms will on-
ly undertake training if it is less costly than other options, such as raiding 
the workforces of other companies and immigration. Even then, they will 
seek to hâve the government underwrite the costs of the training. 
Hère again the conclusion we reach is that shortages of skilled workers 
are attributable to our reliance on the private sector. The solution is the 
same: more public sector control and planning. With greater planning and 
control over investment spending, we will be able to generate jobs when 
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they are required and in the industries and régions where they are required. 
At the same time, our ability to forecast manpower requirements and adjust 
training programs accordingly will be much enhanced. 
Without the capacity to control and plan, new innovations in training 
arrangements will corne to naught. 
THE DETAILS OF THE SCHEME 
The main différence in the détails of our proposai and that of Adams 
lies in the treatment of provinces and the définition of a rôle for trade 
unions. On the question of tying in the provinces, Adams simply says that it 
would be désirable to hâve joint action by the fédéral and provincial govern-
ments4. In contrast, we would argue that the fédéral government should im-
pose the levy — which we proposed be one percent of payroll, and then 
allocate the funds to the provinces on the basis of the proportion of the total 
Canadian workforce located in the province. (For example, Manitoba, 
which has approximately 4.0 percent of the total Canadian workforce, 
would receive 4.0 percent of the total training fund.) 
Moreover, the mechanism for screening applications and approving 
projects should be decentralized. In our brief, we proposed the création of a 
screening board in each province comprised of three trade union représen-
tatives, two employer représentatives and one représentative from each of 
the fédéral and provincial governments. 
This approach would, we believe, ensure the co-operation of most pro-
vincial governments. 
On the question of the rôle for trade unions in a training levy scheme, 
Adams argues that their input should be restricted to the collective bargain-
ing process on the grounds that we should avoid imposing constraints on 
employers. We reject this argument. Indeed, in our brief we proposed that 
one of the criteria that should be imposed on the provincial screening bodies 
in the assessment of projects is that applications from unionized firms 
should not be considered unless they hâve the approval of the union. The 
justification for this is that we believe training should be related to the long-
term needs of workers and Canadian society, not the immédiate needs of 
capital. That trade unions, as représentatives of workers, are better placed 
to assess such needs than the custodians of capital should be obvious. 
Capital is mobile and has but a single interest, namely, earning profits. 
Workers, in contrast, are immobile; hère for the duration. Consequently, 
they are obliged to consider the interests of society; indeed, they are society. 
The record of the trade unions in fighting for reforms bénéficiai to past, 
current and coming générations of workers speaks for itself. 
4 Incidentally, in 1974, George BAIN, at that time Director of the Industrial Relations 
Research Unit in Coventry, England, was commissioned to review training programs in 
Manitoba and corne up with proposais for innovations. He recommended the introduction of a 
levy-grant scheme similar to the Brisith one. "Industrial Training, The Disadvantaged and the 
Private Sector", September, 1974. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENT 
In conclusion, we would simply say that this comment is not intended 
to denigrate the proposal put forward by Roy J. Adams, but rather to ex-
pand on it and clarify some of the issues involved. We trust that Adams' 
pièce and our comment will stimulate some fruitful debate on the questions 
of employment and training in the Canadian economy. 
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